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IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
CITY CONSUMER SERVICES, INC., 
a New Jersey Corporation, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
VERA HESS PETERS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 880453 
Priority No. 14(b) 
BRIEF OF THE RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1988, as 
amended). 
This is an appeal from a Summary Judgment granted by 
the trial court in favor of City Consumer Services, Inc. The 
Motion was granted by Judge Douglas L. Cornaby of the Second 
Judicial District Court, Davis County, State of Utah, on 
November 18, 1988. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court properly rule that City 
Consumer Services, Inc. (hereafter "CCS") was entitled to 
Summary Judgment as there were no material issues of fact. 
2. Is CCS entitled to Summary Judgment as a matter 
of law? 
3. Was the trial court's award of attorney's fees 
and costs to CCS proper? 
RELEVANT STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32. Sale of trust property bv 
trustee - Action to recover balance due upon obligation for 
which trust deed was given as security — Collection of costs 
and attorney's fees. 
At any time within three months after any 
sale of property under a trust deed, as 
hereinabove provided, an action may be 
commenced to recover the balance due upon 
the obligation for which the trust deed was 
given as security, and in such action the 
complaint shall set forth the entire amount 
of the indebtedness which was secured by 
such trust deed, the amount for which such 
property was sold, and the fair market value 
thereof at the date of sale. Before 
rendering judgment, the court shall find the 
fair market value at the date of sale of the 
property sold. The court may not render 
judgment for more than the amount by which 
the amount of the indebtedness with 
interest, costs, and expenses of sale, 
including trustee's and attorney's fees, 
exceeds the fair market value of the 
property as of the date of the sale. In any 
action brought under this section, the 
prevailing party shall be entitled to 
collect its costs and reasonable attorney 
fees incurred in bringing an action under 
this section. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-1. Form of Action — 
Judgment — Special Execution. 
There can be one action for the recovery of 
any debt or the enforcement of any rights 
secured solely by mortgage upon real estate 
which action must be in accordance with the 
provisions of this chapter. Judgment shall 
be given adjudging the amount due, with 
costs and disbursements and the sale of 
mortgaged property, or some part thereof, to 
satisfy said amount and accruing costs, and 
directing the sheriff to proceed and sale 
the same according to the provisions of law 
relating to sales on execution, and a 
special execution or order of sale shall be 
issued for that purpose. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a summary judgment entered in 
favor of Respondent, CCS, by the Second District Court in Davis 
County. 
Course of Proceedings Below 
Respondent, CCS, filed suit against Vera Hess Peters 
(hereafter "Peters") in Second District Court in October, 
1987. Following completion of discovery, CCS filed a Motion 
for Summary Judgment. Judge Douglas L. Cornaby granted CCS' 
motion on September 28, 1988. Peters appeals from that 
Judgment. 
Statement of Undisputed Facts 
In April of 1981, Peters executed a Note (the "Note") 
in the amount of $19,500.00 in favor of CCS. According to the 
terms of the Note, Peters was obligated to make payments on the 
Note beginning June 5, 1981 and continuing until the obligation 
was paid in full. Peters' obligation was secured by a Deed of 
Trust (the "Lien") on the real property located at 1245 Siesta 
Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah (the "Property"). As consideration 
for the execution of the Note, CCS released funds in the amount 
of $19,500.00 to Peters. (R. 2). 
In October of 1986, Peters became delinquent on her 
payment schedule and CCS began sending her delinquency notices 
and demands for payment. Despite CCS's numerous demands for 
payment, Peters failed and refused to make the payments that 
were due on the Note. On June 22, 1987, the lien was 
eliminated by the foreclosure of a senior lienholder. (R. 2-3). 
Based on an examination of appraisals of the Property, 
costs and expenses of carrying and selling the Property and the 
amount of its loan, CCS decided not to bid at the senior 
lienholder*s foreclosure sale as there was no equity in the 
property to satisfy Peters' obligation. (R. 3). 
CCS filed an action on the Note in Second District 
Court on October 21, 1987. (R. 1). On August 18, 1988, CCS 
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, a Memorandum in Support of 
Motion and the Affidavit of Kathleen Hackett. (R. 19-31). 
Peters filed a Memorandum in Opposition to CCS's Summary 
Judgment Motion on September 12, 1988. (R. 34-43). On 
September 20, 1988, CCS filed a Response to Defendant's 
Memorandum and a Motion to Strike Peters' Memorandum in 
Opposition on the grounds that Peters did not comply with Rule 
2.8(b) of the Rules of Practice in the District Courts and 
Circuit Courts of the State of Utah (R. 59-68) (the "Rules of 
Practice"). Specifically, CCS argued that Peters' Memorandum 
failed to specify the facts in dispute as required by Rule 
2.8(e) of the Rules of Practice and that the Memorandum was not 
filed within the ten day limit prescribed by Rule 2.8(b) of the 
Rules of Practice, (R. 59-61). 
Oral argument was heard by the Court on September 27, 
1988, and on September 28, 1988, the Court granted CCS's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, but found that Peters was entitled to a 
hearing on what constituted reasonable attorney's fees. (R. 
79) . 
On October 24, 1988 CCS filed a Motion for 
Determination of Attorney's Fees and an Affidavit of J. Scott 
Lundberg, including an Exhibit itemizing the fees incurred. 
(R. 84-92). After a hearing on the Motion on November 1, 1988, 
the Court awarded the attorney's fees sought by CCS with the 
exception that the time of attorney J. Scott Lundberg be 
reduced to a rate of $100.00 per hour. (R. 93). The Court 
entered Summary Judgment on November 21, 1988, and Peters filed 
this appeal. (R. 94-96)• 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
CCS' Motion for Summary Judgment was properly granted 
below. The affidavit of Kathleen Hackett and the Memorandum 
filed by CCS supported the conclusion that there were no 
material issues of fact. Additionally, CCS* facts were 
uncontroverted as Peters failed to file opposing affidavits. 
According to this court in Franklin Financial v. New 
Empire Development Company, 659 P-2d 1040 (Utah 1983), once the 
moving party has established a case for summary judgment the 
opponent "must file responsive affidavits raising factual 
issues, or risk the trial court's conclusion that there are no 
factual issues, . . . " id. at 1044. 
CCS was entitled to Summary Judgment as a matter of 
law. The Utah "one-action" rule is inapplicable on these 
facts, or in the alternative, CCS is within the exception to 
the rule. Likewise, the deficiency statute is inapplicable on 
the facts before this court. The deficiency statute regulates 
the creditor who elects to sell the property to satisfy the 
debt and then seeks further relief against the debtor. As CCS 
never foreclosed its interest in the property, the statute is 
inapplicable to this action. 
Finally, the Utah Supreme Court in Beckstrom v. 
Beckstrom, 578 P.2d 520 (Utah 1978), held that the trial 
court's discretion in awarding attorneys' fees will not be 
disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. The 
facts below establish that CCS presented evidence on the 
reasonableness of the claimed fees and the trial court made a 
determination. As Peters failed to establish any facts 
constituting abuse of discretion, the trial court's judgment 
should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
The standard of review to be applied by an appellate 
court where summary judgment is granted below is well 
established: 
Our inquiry on review is whether there is any genuine 
issue as to any material fact, and if there is not, 
whether the plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Rule 57(c), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; Fredrick May & Co., Inc. v. Dunn, 368 P.2d 
266 (Utah 1962); Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck 
Center, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P.2d 559 (Utah 1960). 
The defendant cannot rely upon the mere allegations or 
denials of her pleadings to avoid a summary judgment 
but must set forth specific facts showing that there 
is a genuine issue for trial, Rule 56(c), U.R.C.P. 
Thornock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1979). 
CCS established through uncontroverted testimony and 
evidence, the lack of any material issue of fact. Further, it 
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, the 
trial court's decision should be affirmed. 
POINT I 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED BELOW WHERE THE 
RECORD ESTABLISHES THAT THE FACTS WERE UNCONTROVERTED. 
Appellant argues that summary judgment in favor of CCS 
was inappropriate as factual issues remained in dispute. 
Appellant's argument is erroneous for several reasons. 
A. The Affidavit of Kathleen Hackett Supports Summary 
Judgment in Favor of CCS, 
CCS filed a memorandum supporting its motion for 
summary judgment. The memorandum set forth fifteen undisputed 
material facts and included the required citations to the 
supporting portions of the record. 
Additionally, CCS filed the affidavit of an employee, 
Kathleen Hackett. As the individual responsible for collecting 
the delinquent account of Peters, Hackett asserted facts based 
on her personal knowledge of the delinquency and collection of 
the account- Specifically, Hackett stated that after reviewing 
an appraisal of the property's value, the amounts due on the 
existing liens and the carrying costs and costs of 
reconditioning and marketing, CCS decided not to bid at the 
senior's foreclosure sale. (R. 31). 
Hackett's affidavit supports CCS' allegations that the 
senior foreclosed and eliminated its junior lien and that the 
security was lost through no fault of CCS'. 
B. Peters Failed to Establish Controverting Facts. 
Summary Judgment was appropriate on the record before 
the court. CCS submitted memorandum and supporting affidavits 
to establish that there were no factual disputes. 
1. Peters Failed To File Opposing Affidavits. 
In spite of the facts established by CCS through the 
Affidavit of Kathleen Hackett, Peters failed to submit opposing 
affidavits. This appeared to be a factor in the court's ruling 
on the motion for Summary Judgment as the court stated: 
The defendant did not file any affidavits 
controverting the facts set forth in the 
Affidavit of Kathleen Hackett. The 
defendant relied on allegations and denials 
in his pleadings. This is insufficient to 
show there is an issue of fact. 
(R. 79). 
Appellant cites Lockhart v. Equitable Realty Company, 
658 P.2d 1333 (Utah 1983), and argues that it was unnecessary 
for Peters to submit affidavits opposing Kathleen Hackett's 
testimony. Lockhart, however, is distinguishable. 
In that case, the plaintiff was a second position 
lienholder who disclaimed any interest in the property and 
initiated a deficiency action before the senior lienholder1s 
sale. Following the trial court's grant of summary judgment in 
favor of Lockhart, the defendant appealed arguing that the 
plaintiff was barred from recovering for failure to comply with 
the Utah "one-action" rule. The Utah Supreme Court reversed 
the trial court and held: 
In the instant case, defendants' affirmative 
defense and motion to dismiss, based upon 
Lockhart's failure to comply with the 
provisions of U.C.A., 1953, § 78-37-1, 
precludes the granting of summary judgment 
in favor of Lockhart. Lockhart concedes 
that it has abandoned the security prior to 
the disposition of Zions' foreclosure. 
(Emphasis added). 
Id- at 1335. 
The court based its holding precluding summary 
judgment on the fact that Lockhart "conceded" that it had 
abandoned its security and filed its deficiency action before 
the senior lienholder had foreclosed; 
It was, therefore, unnecessary for 
defendants to submit opposing affidavits as 
to this issue in order to comply with Rule 
56(e), supra, because the issue . . . was 
uncontroverted by Lockhart's affidavits. 
Id. at 1335. 
The case at bar is distinguishable as CCS not only 
controverted the allegations in Peters' pleadings, but 
established through Hackett's affidavit and various documents 
that no material issues of fact existed. 
Utah case law requires opposing affidavits to avoid 
summary judgment where the moving party has established facts 
supporting a summary disposition of the case. In Franklin 
Financial v. New Empire Development Company, 659 P.2d 1040 
(Utah 1983)/ the vendor of an apartment complex brought suit to 
foreclose a contract of sale and recover the amounts due under 
the contract and several promissory notes. 
The vendors moved for and were granted summary 
judgment after the defendants failed to file opposing 
affidavits and memorandum. The property was sold and the 
vendors retained all the proceeds of the sale. Three junior 
lienholders appealed seeking a share of the sale proceeds and 
challenging the vendor's priority position. 
On appeal, the lienholders argued that summary 
judgment was inappropriate as there were genuine issues of 
material fact appearing on the face of the affidavits submitted 
by the vendors. Specifically/ the appellants pointed to the 
fact that while a modification agreement was covered in the 
vendor's affidavits, the effect of the modification on the 
interest rates in the underlying obligation was never 
addressed. Noting the deficiency in the movant's affidavit. 
the court, nevertheless, affirmed the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment and stated: 
The opponent of the motion, once a prima 
facie case for summary judgment has been 
made, must file responsive affidavits 
raising factual issues, or risk the trial 
court's conclusion that there are no factual 
issues, . • • 
Id, at 1044, The court elaborated on the necessity of opposing 
affidavits: 
Thus, when a party opposes a properly 
supported motion for summary judgment and 
fails to file any responsive affidavits or 
other evidentiary materials allowed by Rule 
56(e), the trial court may properly conclude 
that there are no genuine issues of fact 
unless the face of the movant's affidavit 
affirmatively discusses the existence of 
such an issue. 
Id. 
Applied to the facts of this case/ Peter was not 
required to submit opposing affidavits; however, by failing to 
controvert CCS" version of the facts established by Kathleen 
Hacketfs affidavit, Peters left the court to decide only 
whether the moving party was entitled to summary judgment as a 
matter of law. 
2. Peters Responsive Memorandum To CCS' Motion For 
Summary Judgment Was Deficient. 
The record establishes that CCS filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment on August 18, 1988. The Motion was 
accompanied by a Memorandum in Support of the Motion, and an 
affidavit. Peters failed to file her Memorandum in Opposition 
to Summary Judgment until September 12, 1988. On September 20, 
1988, CCS filed a Motion to Strike Defendant's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on the 
grounds that Peters memorandum was not filed within the ten 
(10) day limit prescribed by Rule 2.8(b) of the Rules of 
Practice. More importantly, when viewed in conjunction with 
Peters' failure to file opposing affidavits, Peters' memorandum 
failed to specify the facts in dispute or refer with 
particularity to the portions of the record she relied on as 
required by Rule 2.8(e) of the Rules of Practice. 
Although the trial court failed to rule on CCS' Motion 
to Strike, it granted CCS' Motion for Summary Judgment on the 
grounds that Peters relied on allegations and denials in 
pleadings that were insufficient to establish that there was an 
issue of fact. This court has repeatedly held that non-movants 
cannot rely on mere allegations or denials in the pleadings to 
overcome contrary evidence established by affidavits, but must 
set forth specific facts establishing a genuine issue for 
trial. Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224 (Utah 1983); Thornock 
v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1979). As Peters failed to 
accomplish this below, summary judgment was properly granted. 
C. Assuming, Arguendo, Some Facts Were in Dispute, There 
Were No Material Issues of Fact Precluding CCS' Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
Summary judgment is appropriate when viewing all of 
the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party 
the record establishes that were are no material issues of 
fact. Thornock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934 (Utah 1979). The key 
phrase in the standard for summary judgment is "material issues 
of fact." According to the Utah Supreme Court: 
The mere existence of genuine issues of fact 
in the case as a whole does not preclude 
entry of summary judgment if those issues 
are immaterial to resolution of the case. 
Horgan v. Industrial Design Corp., 657 P.2d 751, 752 (Utah 
1982) . 
Applied to the facts of this case, assuming, arguendo 
that some facts were in dispute, the material facts were not in 
dispute. Kathleen Hackett's affidavit establishes that Peters 
defaulted on her mortgage payments to CCS and that the senior 
lienholder foreclosed on or about June 22, 1987, eliminating 
CCS' lien on the property. (R. 20-21). The legal conclusion 
from these facts is that CCS' interest in the property was 
eliminated by the foreclosure of the first lienholder. At this 
point, CCS* only option was to bid at the seniors' foreclosure 
sale; a futile exercise based on CCS' appraisals of the 
property, the amount due on the first lien, costs to carry the 
property and costs of marketing. 
As Peters failed to controvert any of the material 
issues established by CCS, summary judgment was properly 
granted by the trial court. 
POINT II 
CCS WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF 
LAW. 
Once this court is satisfied that there are no issues 
of material fact precluding summary judgment it must then 
determine whether the movant is entitled to summary judgment as 
a matter of law, CCS established, through uncontroverted 
testimony and evidence, the lack of any material issue of 
fact. Further, CCS is entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
as more fully set forth below. 
A. CCS' Claim Does Not Violate the "One-Action Rule." 
The "one-action ruleM is found in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-37-1 (1953, as amended), and provides that "there can be 
one action for the recovery of any debt or the enforcement of 
any right secured solely by mortgage upon real estate." While 
the rule refers to mortgages, it is well established that the 
provision applies to trust deeds as well. See Utah Mortgage & 
Loan Co. v. Black, 618 P.2d 43 (Utah 1980). The rule allows a 
lender to pursue a borrower on a deficiency claim only after 
the collateral has been exhausted through foreclosure by the 
lender or a senior lienholder. First Security Bank of Utah v. 
Pelger, 658 F.Supp. 175 (D. Utah 1987); Lockhart v. Eguitable 
Realty Co., 657 P.2d 1333 (Utah 1983). 
1. Compliance With The MOne-ActionM Rule Is Not A 
Question of Fact Precluding Summary Judgment. 
Appellant cites Utah Mortgage & Loan Co. v. Black, 618 
P.2d 43 (Utah 1980), and argues that compliance with the 
one-action rule is a guestion of fact precluding summary 
judgment. Appellant's reliance on Black is misplaced as the 
case is distinguishable from the facts before this court. 
In Black, the debtor executed a promissory note in 
favor of the creditor, Utah Mortgage, in exchange for a 
subdivision loan. The note was secured by a trust deed on the 
property that was to be subdivided. The trust deed provided 
that the trustee could reconvey "all or any part" of the 
property upon written request by Utah Mortgage. According to 
affidavits filed on behalf of Utah Mortgage, this provision was 
requested by the Blacks and agreed to by Utah Mortgage. 
Pursuant to the agreement, the lots were released and 
the proceeds were applied to the loan. After releasing all of 
the lots and applying all the proceeds, a $36,760.01 deficiency 
remained. Utah Mortgage brought suit and Black moved for 
summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiff failed to comply 
with the Mone-action rule." The trial court granted the motion 
and Utah Mortgage appealed. 
This court held that summary judgment was improperly 
granted below where there was a dispute as to a material issue. 
The critical question here is whether, as 
defendants contend, the plaintiff had 'sole 
discretion1 as to whether, and for what 
amounts, it would release the lots; or, as 
the plaintiff contends, the defendants both 
agreed to and requested that the lots be 
released on payments of the amounts . . • 
which did not aggregate enough to pay for 
the defendant's debt. 
Id. at 45-46. 
The court went on to explain why the issue was 
important: 
We proceed upon the premise, . . . that when 
a creditor uses up the security which it was 
agreed would stand good for his debt, he may 
not look to the debtor personally for any 
deficiency. In any event, that principle 
would not apply when the security has been 
lost or disposed of without any fault or 
blameworthy conduct on the sort of creditor 
(plaintiff here.) In such instance, an 
action may be brought upon the note without 
going through a fruitless procedure of 
foreclosure on non-existent security. 
Id. at 45. 
Thus, the fact was undisputed that Utah Mortgage had 
"used up the security which it agreed would stand good for the 
debt.M After determining that the creditor had released its 
security, a question of fact existed as to whether the action 
constituted fault or blameworthy conduct sufficient to warrant 
a violation of the "one-action rule." On this basis, Black is 
distinguishable. 
In the case at bar, the facts are undisputed that CCS 
did not "use up the security." CCS did not release the 
security rather, the evidence supports the trial court's 
conclusion: 
That rule [the one-action rule] is not 
applicable in this case. There was a senior 
lien foreclosure of the property on June 22, 
1987. The plaintiff did not bid at the sale 
because it made the judgment that there was 
not an economic justification for doing so. 
After the sale there was no property to 
foreclose on. The plaintiff is not required 
to go through a fruitless procedure. 
Judge Cornaby's Ruling on Motion for summary 
Judgment. (R. 79)• 
This is not a case where compliance with the 
"one-action rule" is a question of fact precluding summary 
judgment. 
2. The (Incontroverted Evidence Establishes That The 
"One-Action Rule" Is Inapplicable Because the 
Senior Lienholder Foreclosed Eliminating CCS' 
Interest. 
It is well established that the goal of foreclosure is 
to put the foreclosure purchaser in the position that the 
mortgagor was in at the time the foreclosed mortgage was 
executed. 1 BYU Legal Studies/ Summary of Utah Real Property 
Law at 418 (1978). This goal is accomplished by terminating 
all interests junior to the mortgage being foreclosed. G. 
Osborne, Handbook on the Law of Mortgages § 319 (2d ed. 1970). 
Thus, if a senior lienholder forecloses, and all junior 
mortgagees are properly joined, the junior mortgages are 
eliminated. 
Appellant's argument seems to suggest that the 
one-action rule requires a junior lienholder to bid at the 
foreclosure sale of a senior lienholder or be precluded from 
pursuing the borrower on the Note. While, as a practical 
matter, a junior position lienholder may bid at a senior's 
foreclosure in order to foreclose its own trust deed and 
collect the equity in the property, the statute does not 
require such actions by a junior lienholder. The statute 
merely requires that a lender exhaust the security before 
proceeding against the borrower. A sale by a senior lienholder 
eliminates all junior liens. The junior's note is no longer 
secured; thus, there is no security to exhaust and the junior 
lienholder should be allowed to seek relief on the Note. 
Applied to the facts of this case, the evidence below 
establishes that CCS held a second position lien on the 
property. When Peters defaulted on her obligation to the 
senior lienholder, the senior foreclosed and terminated CCS' 
interest. (R. 21). The "one-action rule" is, therefore, 
inapplicable because CCS' interest was extinguished. 
3. Assuming, Arguendo, That The "One-Action Rule" Is 
Applicable, The Evidence Establishes That The 
Exception To The "One-Action Rule" Is Controlling 
In This Case. 
If this court rules that the one-action rule requires 
a junior lienholder to bid at a foreclosure sale by the senior 
lienholder, the trial court's decision should, nevertheless, be 
affirmed if CCS comes within the exception to the one-action 
rule. 
The Utah Supreme Court explained the purpose of the 
"one-action rule", and the underlying public policy concerns in 
Utah Mortgage & Loan Co, v. Black, 628 P.2d 43 (Utah 1980): 
The purpose of the statute was to eliminate 
harassment of debtor and multiple litigation 
which sometimes occurred under the 
common-law rule which allowed a creditor to 
foreclose and sell the land, and to sue on 
the note. The statute limits the creditor 
to one remedy in exhausting his security 
before having recourse to the debtor for a 
deficiency. 
Black, 618 P.2d at 45. 
Thus, the purpose of the rule is to protect debtors 
from multitudinous lawsuits; however, the court went on to 
explain that the protection of the statute is unnecessary and 
the rule is inapplicable "when the security has been lost or 
disposed of without any fault or blameworthy conduct on the 
part of the creditor." id. at 45. 
The exception was further discussed and applied in 
First Security Bank of Utah v. Felger, 658 F.Supp. 175 (D. Utah 
1987). There, First Security brought an action to collect on a 
promissory note that was secured by a second trust deed after 
foreclosing on the property under a first trust deed. The 
defendants argued that because First Security failed to 
foreclose the second trust deed before seeking a deficiency it 
was barred, under the "one-action rule," from recovery. 
Rejecting this argument and upholding summary judgment in favor 
of First Security, the court reiterated: 
a creditor is precluded from seeking a 
deficiency only where the creditor's 
negligence or illegal conduct has resulted 
in the loss of the collateral, or where the 
creditor voluntarily released the junior 
lien. 
Id. at 182. 
Applying the exception, the court held that First 
Security's actions were not negligent or blameworthy where it 
appraised the property and relied in good faith on the 
appraisal in deciding to extinguish the second lien and bring 
an action on the note. id. The court noted that the 
application of the rule would not serve the public policy 
concerns underlying the statute and stated, "The 'one-action 
rule' was enacted to prevent double recovery by creditors, not 
to completely deny recovery of a legal debt." Id. 
In the case at bar, the rule is likewise 
inapplicable. The facts establish that on June 22, 1987, the 
senior lienholder foreclosed, eliminated CCS' junior lien, and 
prompted CCS to initiate this action against Peters to recover 
on the debt. After reviewing appraisals of the property, the 
costs and expenses of carrying and selling the property and the 
amount of its loan, CCS elected not to bid at the foreclosure 
sale by the senior lienholder due to its belief that there was 
no "real" equity for it remaining to satisfy the Note. 
(R. 21). As in First Security Bank v. Feloer, CCS obtained an 
appraisal and relied on it in good faith in deciding not to bid 
at the foreclosure sale by a senior lienholder. Additionally, 
CCS went through a detailed analysis of anticipated costs and 
expenses to cure Peters* default and market the property. 
Thus, its actions are not blameworthy, Id. at 182. 
Although Peters would have the Court believe that 
there was sufficient equity in the property to cover the amount 
due to CCS, that approach simply ignores the considerations 
required to be taken into account by a junior lienholder in 
such a situation. The junior lienholder would have to advance 
its own funds to pay off the debt owing to the senior 
lienholder. It would thereby tie up funds which could 
otherwise be lent out at market rates. It must take into 
account the actual costs it would incur in managing, 
reconditioning and preparing the Property for marketing. It 
must also consider the actual costs it would incur in selling 
the Property. 
Assuming 6 to 12 months would be required to market 
the property at the appraised value, and assuming that CCS 
could receive 10% return on money loaned in the market place, 
the cost to plaintiff of paying off the senior lien would run 
between $2,500 and $5,000. 
In order to match the commissions of ten percent (10%) 
now being offered by the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development on repossessed homes, CCS would pay approximately 
$7,000.00, assuming the property were marketed at its appraised 
value of $70,250.00. 
Experience has shown over the past couple of years 
that properties listed for sale are not bringing the appraised 
value. Therefore, it is unlikely that the Property could have 
been marketed by CCS for $70/250. Further evidence that the 
real value of the property was not $70/250 can be seen in the 
fact that despite the supposed equity of $20,000, no one else 
bid at the foreclosure by the senior lienholder. 
In addition to the costs of marketing and paying off 
the senior lien, and questions regarding the real value, CCS 
was faced with the likelihood of expenses to put the Property 
into marketable condition. The appraisal was done without 
access to the Property's interior. CCS would not be 
unreasonable in anticipating additional costs of repair and 
maintenance. Additionally, as the Property is a part of a 
condominium project, CCS would be faced with common area 
assessments if it took back the Property. Those items would 
also reduce the perceived equity. 
After reviewing the costs associated with "protecting" 
its secured position on the property, CCS concluded that it was 
economically unjustifiable to do so. That determination cannot 
be viewed as "fault" on the part of CCS. If CCS had failed to 
engage in that exercise, perhaps "fault" could be found. 
However, CCS engaged in a careful review of the situation and 
made a reasonable decision under the circumstances. The only 
fault in this case lies with Peters who defaulted in payments 
under the terms of the Note. 
Appellant attempts to compare this case to Lockhart v. 
Equitable Realty Co., 657 P.2d 1333 (Utah 1983). However, 
Lockhart is distinguishable. In Lockhart, the creditor held a 
note secured by a second position trust deed. When the senior 
lienholder foreclosed Lockhart disclaimed any interest in the 
property and initiated a deficiency action prior to the senior 
lien foreclosure sale. The trial court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Lockhart and the debtor appealed arguing 
that the "one-action rule" barred Lockhart from recovering a 
deficiency, Id. at 1334. Lockhart responded that its actions 
were protected under the exception to the "one-action rule." 
Id. at 1335. Reversing the lower court's decision, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the exception to the "one-action rule" 
was inapplicable because Lockhart had commenced the action on 
the note before the senior lienholder had foreclosed and before 
a deficiency had been determined. Id. at 1336. The court drew 
a distinction between the facts of Lockhart, where the 
deficiency action was initiated prior to the foreclosure by the 
first lienholder, and the facts of Cache Valley Banking Co. v. 
Logan, 56 P.2d 1046 (Utah 1936), where the deficiency was 
initiated after the foreclosure sale. The court held: 
[I]t is not enough to speculate that the 
security is valueless, or might become 
valueless if foreclosed by the senior 
lienholder. Rather, the security must be, 
in fact, exhausted and a deficiency 
established to a certainty in order for the 
exception to apply. 
Id. at 1336. 
The case currently before this court is closer 
factually to Cache Vallev Banking Co. than Lockhart. CCS did 
not speculate that their security might become valueless, 
rather, the senior lienholder foreclosed and extinguished CCS' 
interest. Once the security was exhausted and Peters' 
deficiency was established to a certainty, CCS brought suit for 
the deficiency. (R. 79). 
Surely the purpose of the Utah "one-action rule" was 
not to force a lender to go through an expensive, time 
consuming and fruitless procedure to collect on a loan made in 
good faith but where the security has depleted due to market 
forces. The Mone-action rule" was not intended to bar 
legitimate deficiency claims. "The 'one-action rule' was 
enacted to prevent double recovery by creditors, not to 
completely deny recovery of a legal debt." Felger, 658 F. 
Supp. at 82. The uncontroverted facts establish that CCS is 
not seeking double recovery in this case. Application of the 
rule, as urged by appellant, would allow Peters to avoid her 
legal obligation to CCS. 
B. CCS' Claim Does Not Violate The Deficiency Statute. 
Section 57-1-32 of the Utah Code Ann. (1953, as 
amended) (the "deficiency statute") sets forth a procedure for 
recovering the balance remaining on an obligation following a 
sale of the trust property. The statute is applicable to 
actions commenced "after any sale of property under a trust 
deed . . . to recover the balance due upon the obligation for 
which the trust deed was given as security. . . ." 
According to this Court: 
[S]ection 57-1-32 provides the exclusive 
procedure for securing a deficiency judgment 
following a trustee's sale of the real 
property under a trust deed. Plaintiffs' 
election to sell the property to satisfy the 
debt precludes them from seeking any other 
remedy, including damages for breach of 
contract, which might have been available to 
them. 
Cox v. Green, 696 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1985). 
The statute by its very terms is inapplicable to CCS 
as CCS has never foreclosed on the property. Rather, CCS' 
interest was eliminated by the foreclosure of the first 
lienholder. While the statute would be applicable to the 
senior lienholder's actions to collect any remaining 
obligation, the Legislature did not contemplate that the 
statute be enforced against a lender whose security interest 
was eliminated by the foreclosure of a senior lienholder's 
interest. 
Appellant's argument amounts to a plea for the Court 
to create an anti-deficiency statute based on the fact that 
Utah has a "one-action rule." The State of Utah does not have 
statutory or case law authority supporting anti-deficiency 
protection for borrowers. The law merely requires that a 
creditor that forecloses under a deed of trust must pursue any 
remaining deficiency pursuant to the terms of the statute. 
Where, as here, the collateral is exhausted by a senior 
lienholder, the statute is inapplicable to the junior's action 
on the Note. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED FEES AND COSTS TO CCS. 
Following the trial court's grant of summary judgment 
in favor of CCS, CCS filed a Motion for Determination of 
Attorney's Fees. Additionally, CCS filed a supporting 
affidavit by J. Scott Lundberg, the attorney who handled the 
case, including an exhibit itemizing the attorney's fees and 
costs. At the hearing, Peters' attorney, Ephraim H. 
Frankhauser, objected to several of the costs reflected in the 
Exhibit; however, the parties stipulated to the award of $83.00 
in costs. (Transcript p. 3-5). 
Respondent's counsel also challenged the 
reasonableness of CCS' attorneys' fees on the basis of the 
hourly billing rate and the total amount of time spent on the 
matter. Following testimony by Mr. Lundberg, the court awarded 
costs and attorneys' fees of $2,329.25. This figure represents 
the $83.00 stipulated to by the parties and CCS' claimed 
attorneys' fees except that Mr. Lundberg's billing rate for 
10.25 hours was reduced from $120.00 per hour to $100.00 per 
hour. 
The Utah Supreme Court considered a trial court's 
award of attorneys' fees and the appropriate standard of review 
in Beckstrom v. Beckstrom, 578 P.2d 520 (Utah 1978). There, 
the court held that the trial court is endowed with 
considerable discretion, and in the absence of clear abuse of 
discretion, this court will not disturb a trial court's 
judgment. Jd. at 524. 
Similarly in Travner v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856 (Utah 
1984), this court held: 
Where the parties have agreed by contract to 
the payment of attorney fees, the court may 
award reasonable fees in accordance with the 
terms of the parties' agreement. The amount 
to be awarded is largely within the sound 
discretion of the trial court, . . . 
Id. at 858. 
Applied to the facts of this case, appellant has 
failed to point to any part of the record that would support an 
argument that the trial court abused its discretion. The facts 
establish that irrespective of Rule 54(d)(2), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, the parties stipulated to the costs to be 
included in the judgment, and the court heard evidence and 
adjusted an hourly billing rate in making a determination on 
the reasonableness of the claimed attorneys' fees. The trial 
court's judgment should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The material issues of fact were uncontroverted, and 
CCS was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law; thus, 
appellant CCS respectfully petitions this Court to affirm the 
trial court's grant of summary judgment. 
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